Ansarollah Website Official Report
Published: 15 Dhuʻl-Qiʻdah, 1447 AH
At the height of the Israeli assault on the Gaza Strip, while the Yemeni Armed Forces were intensifying support operations for the Palestinian people in the enclave, Saudi intelligence was working relentlessly to establish a joint operations room with American and Israeli intelligence agencies headquartered in Riyadh. The mission of this operations room was to destroy Yemen’s military capabilities through recruited traitors who were trained inside Saudi Arabia and supplied with the equipment necessary to carry out espionage and sabotage tasks.
Security vigilance in Sanaa was matching the momentum of the armed forces. While Yemen’s military struck deep inside occupied Palestine with missiles and drones and imposed a full maritime blockade on Israeli shipping in the Red Sea, Yemeni security services were the watchful eye protecting the homeland from conspirators and infiltrators. With Allah's help, they succeeded in apprehending the American-Israeli-Saudi espionage cell, interrogating its members, and broadcasting their confessions to the public so that all would understand the extent of the decline reached by the Saudi authorities, having embraced treachery and become merely a dirty tool for implementing the Zionist scheme aimed at swallowing the nation, plundering its wealth, and violating its sanctities.
On November 8 of last year, the security services revealed details from the confessions of members of the spy cell regarding how they were recruited and the methods and tools the spies received to carry out their intelligence missions. Today, further details have been disclosed regarding the cell’s methods of recruiting agents, gathering information, and transmitting coordinates of a number of vital civilian, security, and military facilities for the benefit of the enemy’s joint intelligence room.
The confessions document that the officers operating the enemy’s joint intelligence room worked through affiliated mercenaries to recruit and enlist military personnel and others capable of obtaining the required information. Some of them were summoned to the Saudi capital, Riyadh, to meet Saudi and foreign intelligence officers and were supplied with tools that assisted them in espionage work.
The operatives used several methods in carrying out the tasks assigned to them, including obtaining information indirectly through gatherings and public occasions, building relationships with government employees or their relatives, and gathering as much information as possible about military capabilities, the movements of the state’s military and civilian leadership, meetings, workplaces, and residences.
Mission of the Joint Operations Room in Riyadh
Americans, Israelis, and Saudis gathered in a single operations room, each with a role aimed at protecting the Zionist entity from Yemeni fire.
The Israeli side of the joint room included officers affiliated with the military intelligence agency Aman and the foreign intelligence agency Mossad. Their primary task was to analyse data and information, provide devices and technologies, and train spies.
The American side included officers affiliated with the Central Intelligence Agency, who played important technical roles, including analysing data and information and training spies.
The Saudi side participated with both parties in establishing the room, which took Riyadh as its headquarters, through liaison officers affiliated with Saudi intelligence. Their tasks consisted of recruiting and enlisting spies, managing the cells, financing them, and monitoring the implementation of their field activities.
The mission of the joint room in Riyadh consisted of forming multiple espionage cells operating separately and in isolation from one another, and carrying out tasks by dividing them into parts to ensure difficulty of detection and tracking. Some spies within the same cell carried out their tasks without knowledge of the other members or coordination with them. A single mission was also divided into several parts and sections, with each cell executing one specific part without knowing the roles of the complementary cells.
The room supplied the cells with advanced espionage devices and gave their members intensive training at the hands of American, Zionist, and Saudi officers inside the kingdom itself. The training included mastering the arts of camouflage, report writing, and transmitting coordinates with deadly precision.
The management of operatives and cells was characterised by professionalism and a high degree of secrecy to ensure continuity of work and prevent the collapse of the network. Initially, recruits were enlisted by exploiting weak-minded individuals, some during their time as expatriates in Saudi Arabia and others from within Yemen, while using the cover of field surveys for humanitarian objectives as preparation for espionage work.
The cell also relied on the principle of continuity and support through rotating handlers managing the spies, beginning with ongoing training courses to qualify them in the use of espionage devices, raising the operational efficiency of the agents, ensuring continuity of operations even if supervising officers changed, and supplying them with the latest technologies.
In addition, it adopted a principle of expansion and strategic influence, whereby spies were used to recruit other elements through linking the work of the cells to targeting Yemen and its forces,rying to influence its position towards supporting Gaza, developing the network from within with minimal external effort, and focusing on strategic objectives to undermine military and political capabilities, especially in light of operations related to the Palestinian cause.
Nature of the Threat
The confessions of the cell reveal that the Saudi enemy, with American and Zionist support and direction, intensified its intelligence activities inside Yemen after ten years of military failure, particularly following events that revealed Yemen to be resistant to the forces of domination.
A shift in intelligence work was observed from isolated British activity in 2021 to trilateral coordination among the Israeli entity, the United States, and Saudi Arabia, reaching its peak during 2024.
Saudi Arabia hosts the headquarters of the joint operations room and manages a “special committee” linked to thousands of Yemeni mercenary figures, exploiting its long experience inside Yemen. Recruitment methods vary between exploiting mercenaries, more than one million Yemeni expatriates, social media platforms, and qat gatherings where sensitive issues such as the Palestinian cause and Yemen’s role in the Red Sea are discussed.
In addition, starvation and impoverishment policies are used as a principal means of pressure to recruit cells. Objectives focus on gathering information about leaders, military movements, and weapons, extending to carrying out assassinations and targeting drone and missile manufacturing workshops.
The confessions of members of the cell, including a former officer with the rank of lieutenant colonel, revealed an organised structure including a joint operations room, distribution of tasks such as military information, coordinates, airport activity, and weapons depots, financing through money transfers, and the use of phones equipped with encrypted programs.
A plan was also identified to hold meetings outside Yemen with Saudi facilitation. Despite escalating recruitment attempts since 2022, reaching their peak in November 2024, security vigilance, public awareness, and the factor of faith prevented these conspiracies from succeeding.
Analysts confirmed that the absence of a clear “target bank” for the enemy, and the difficulty of penetrating Yemeni society compared with other countries, hinder hostile intelligence operations that rely on traitors and vulnerable individuals.
Content of the Confessions
The spy Farouq Ali Rajeh confessed that at the beginning of the espionage activity he had been serving as an officer in the armed forces with the rank of lieutenant colonel before becoming involved in intelligence work.
He said his espionage activity began in Ramadan 2024 after he was contacted by a mercenary leader identified as Abdullah Al-Haifi. Their first meeting took place at Ayah Roundabout, where he received 140,000 Yemeni riyals.
Al-Haifi asked him to contact another mercenary leader, Ali Al-Bakkali, through Facebook. Al-Bakkali presented him with a list of work areas: awareness activities, counter-thought efforts, recruitment, and intelligence and security work.
He and his colleagues then began operating under the cover of awareness and social activities, including councils of social figures, weddings, and forums, while Al-Haifi published bold posts on X and WhatsApp, raising fears that they would be exposed.
Regarding the relationship with Brigadier Spy Ali Ahmed Al-Sayani, Al-Bakkali informed him of his connection to Al-Sayani. Farouq Ali Rajeh added that he contacted Al-Sayani and offered him membership in the cell. Al-Sayani described him as a known national figure and confirmed that he was directly linked to a man called Abu Khaled, one of the Saudi intelligence officers. Rajeh and Al-Sayani were tasked with transferring military and security information.
Regarding the structure of the cell and financing, the team consisted of seven members within an organised group, with a joint operations room in place. Al-Sayani requested Saudi intelligence to raise the financial allocation to 33,000 Saudi riyals for distribution to the team.
The distributed tasks included providing near-daily information on military movements, monitoring airport and aviation activity, including arrivals and departures, providing intelligence and security information, and transferring coordinates of military sites and weapons depots.
Farouq Rajeh also confessed that he travelled to Saudi Arabia on an Umrah visa. Al-Sayani asked him to obtain 100,000 Saudi riyals from Saudi intelligence, but they did not agree and instead provided only 20,000 riyals.
He added that he carried two containers of honey as a gift from Al-Sayani to Abu Khaled, met Abu Khaled in a cafeteria inside Saudi Arabia, and delivered the gift. After 20 days, Abu Khaled handed him a bag containing seven phones equipped with a hidden communications program. He was trained to operate them using a special code, then returned to Sanaa and handed Al-Sayani the phone designated for him.
He also acknowledged coordinating with Al-Sayani in transferring military and security information and coordinates to the joint operations room. The team received a weekly operational bulletin on a white sheet of paper from a source affiliated with Al-Sayani, which was then transmitted by phone to the operations room, while they also received additional information from a source connected to the office of one of the deputy ministers.
Rajeh further indicated that Abu Khaled asked him to inform Al-Sayani that the “higher level” wished to meet him, and enemy intelligence asked Al-Sayani to specify the country in which he preferred the meeting to be held.
He added that intelligence officers stated that “Yemen is approaching complete change,” that “coming events will change the situation,” and that Al-Sayani would be “the man of the stage in the coming events.” Al-Sayani agreed in principle and selected Cairo as the location for the meeting.
