Ansarollah Website. Analysis | Anas Al-Qadi

Introduction:

Since the beginning of the week, the governorates of Hadramawt and Al-Mahra have witnessed rapid transformations representing the most extensive redistribution of foreign military and political influence in eastern Yemen since 2015. These transformations are driven by three main intersecting trends:

First: The expansion of the Southern Transitional Council, backed by the UAE, beyond permissible limits, particularly in areas linked to border crossings and energy pipelines. Second: Growing Saudi concern about the shifting balance of power, which could affect the security of its southern borders, oil routes, and strategically important ports. Third: The lack of cohesion within local military structures, represented by the First Military Region in the east, and their vulnerability to rapid collapse under the first serious pressure, as demonstrated in  Hadramawt Valley in particular.

In this context, Saudi Arabia chose to move from a policy of "remote guidance" to a policy of direct pressure by pushing the so-called "Homeland Shield" forces into the scene of operations, which led to a radical change in the equations of power, and transformed the scene in the occupied Yemeni regions from a mere competition between mercenary agents to a Saudi security and political engineering that is redrawing the features of control in the East.

The Structure of Field Transformation and Redeployment

Hadramawt: The Shift in Initiative Among the Tools of Occupation

Hadramawt witnessed a rapid and striking field transformation. Within the first hours of the so-called "Southern Transitional Council" (backed by the UAE occupation) announcing its control over large areas of  Hadramawt Valley, its convoys in Al-Abr-Al-Wadi'ah desert were subjected to successive attacks, and a number of its leaders were wounded in attacks inside the city of Sayun. These developments revealed three important facts:

The "Southern Transitional Council's" inability to operate in a stable environment within Hadramawt, unlike its traditional strongholds in Aden, Lahj, and Al-Dhali', or even Hadramawt coast, which it has controlled for years.

The lack of security for its forces' movements in Hadramawt, lines that are difficult to secure against local actors (the same problem it faces in Abyan and Shabwa, where it has been unable to secure its movements despite the military operations it conducts).

It lacks a local base in the valley capable of providing the social depth necessary for its survival.

At the height of this confusion, the so-called "Homeland Shield" forces announced they had taken control of the 23rd Mechanized Brigade's positions in Al-Abr and "secured" the vital international highway linking Hadramawt to the Saudi border. This move is not merely a "takeover of positions," but rather a shift of the center of gravity on the ground to forces loyal to Riyadh, displacing the Southern Transitional Council (STC) from the most sensitive locations linked to trade routes, oil fields, and border crossings.

In this sense, the Saudi occupation's actions appear to be a strategic response to control the situation on the ground in its favor and prevent the STC from imposing a fait accompli that could threaten the Saudi occupier's border and economic security arrangements. Meanwhile, it represents a role reversal between the Saudis and Emiratis, keeping the occupied Yemeni scene volatile.

Al-Mahra: A Soft Saudi Takeover

In Al-Mahra—further confirming the ongoing drama—Saudi Arabia has adopted a different model, one of soft takeover without open confrontation. Nishtun military camp, Al-Ghaydah International Airport, intelligence buildings, the central prison, and the passport office were handed over to the so-called "Homeland Shield" forces (supported by the Saudi occupation) with minimal resistance, despite the fact that the so-called "Southern Transitional Council" (supported by the UAE occupation) had raised its flags at these locations when it recently seized control.

With this takeover, Al-Mahra falls under almost complete Saudi occupation, guaranteeing Mohammed bin Salman control over the ports, border crossings, and its maritime access to the Arabian Sea.

Organizational Structures and Positioning Implications

"Homeland Shield": The Saudi Arm for Redesigning the Security Landscape

The "Homeland Shield" forces were formed in 2023 as a "central reserve force" with Saudi backing. Its composition is predominantly Salafist, and its geographical distribution demonstrates a meticulously planned deployment:

In Al-Mahra: Led by Abdullah bin Sudaif, it oversees two brigades responsible for securing the airport, ports, and security headquarters.

In Wadi Hadramawt: Two brigades replaced the 23rd Mechanized Brigade in Al-Abr and its surrounding areas.

On international highways: The Second Division, led by Fahd Ba'moumen, is deployed. This force comprises individuals from the oil-rich and influential governorates of Hadramawt and Shabwa.

This deployment indicates that Saudi Arabia is not merely seeking to contain the Southern Transitional Council (STC), but rather to establish a parallel force (a Salafist alternative to the Muslim Brotherhood) that is not tied to traditional political structures and can implement the Saudi security agenda.

The Southern Transitional Council: Erosion of Influence and Exposure of Limited Power

The Southern Transitional Council entered Hadramawt and Al-Mahra with significant media fanfare, raising the slogan "Operation Promising Future." However, the reality on the ground proved entirely different, as it quickly faced three sharp declines:

The removal of separatist symbols through the removal of separatist flags from captured sites.

Strict directives from Saudi General Saud al-Qahtani ordering the forces to return to their original camps.

The collapse of supply lines due to repeated attacks.

As a result, the Southern Transitional Council rapidly transitioned from an aggressor to a force confined within its camps, threatened with losing what remains of its influence should it clash militarily with the "Homeland Shield" forces.

General Trends in the Strategic Landscape

Saudi Arabia: Consolidating Centralized Security Decision-Making to Secure its Interests

Saudi Arabia has shifted from crisis management to shaping the landscape. After the Southern Transitional Council (STC) exceeded its permitted limits, Riyadh concluded that allowing it to remain unchecked would:

Threaten the balance of power between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi in Yemen.

Undermine the political equation sponsored by the Kingdom in the occupied Yemeni governorates.

Hence the Saudi move, which it presented as "decisive," adopting a two-pronged strategy:

Political pressure (an ultimatum to withdraw and hand over positions) and a military operation (replacing "Homeland Shield" mercenaries in sensitive locations).

Thus, Saudi Arabia redefined the role of the STC in eastern Yemen from a "dominant force" to a "marginalized force."

The Decline of the Emirati Role: The Beginning of a New Phase

Abu Dhabi is still refraining from direct confrontation, but the indicators are clearr

Loss of vital positions,

Neutralization of the Southern Transitional Council's mercenary forces,

The emergence of a parallel mercenary force loyal to Riyadh,

And a decline in the UAE's ability to use the Southern Transitional Council as an expansionist tool.

Despite the current silence, the UAE may use its political, economic, or security tools to redivide the occupied territories, especially if it feels that Saudi Arabia is encroaching on areas it considered within its traditional sphere of influence. This aligns with Aidarus al-Zubaidi's statement on Saturday regarding what he called "preserving achievements and gains," and raising hopes for a "modern federal state of South Yemen," according to al-Zubaidi.

In summary

Hadramawt and Al-Mahra are entering a new phase. The situation is no longer merely a struggle for control, but rather a Saudi project to restructure security and power in eastern Yemen to serve its interests. This project rests on three pillars:

"Shield of the Nation": The central force of mercenaries (with a Salafist orientation) that controls the ports, security headquarters, airports, and borders.

"The Southern Transitional Council": A mercenary force with limited mobility, losing its ability to project independent influence.

The UAE: An actor experiencing a relative decline, awaiting confirmation as to whether it will reposition itself or simply adapt.

What about the future?

Ultimately, a new eastern Yemen is taking shape, determined less by the local balance of power and more by the decisions of the Saudi occupier, which has re-emerged as the primary player in this strategic region. Although the scales currently tip in Riyadh's favor, this dominance is unstable and cannot be considered a definitive resolution of the situation.

It is not unlikely that the UAE will resort to a counter-offensive to restore the balance, which could ignite new clashes between the mercenaries, particularly around the oil facilities in Hadramawt. The Saudi-Emirati rivalry – which is still under some degree of joint control, as demonstrated by the agreement to neutralize the “First Military Region” and the “Muslim Brotherhood” – remains susceptible to slipping into a direct clash between the instruments under certain circumstances if it gets out of control.