A new analytical assessment draws its foundation from a research paper published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on 1 December 2025, titled “Constellation Shock: The Frigate Decision Puts the U.S. Navy on a New and Uncertain Course.” The paper was authored by Nick Childs, a senior researcher in Naval Forces and Maritime Security at the institute, known for analyzing the naval capabilities of states and for contributing annually to The Military Balance. His work is widely regarded as a primary reference within the Western maritime community, lending significant weight to his perspectives on global naval developments and major powers' maritime policies.

Childs’ paper gains exceptional importance as it originates from one of the world’s most influential research institutions specializing in Western military strategy. Its publication came at a particularly sensitive moment—just days after the U.S. Navy’s decision on 25 November 2025 to cancel the future Constellation-class frigate program. That cancellation triggered extensive debate within American and international military circles over the future of the U.S. fleet and its ability to adapt to rapid technological and operational shifts in modern naval warfare.

Within this context, the current assessment relies on Childs’ analysis as a revealing internal perspective on one of the most profound structural crises the U.S. Navy has faced in two decades. It also provides a key entry point for understanding how this crisis influences global naval power balances, the evolving security environment in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab, and Yemen’s position amid these transformations.

Structural Implications of Canceling the Constellation-Class Frigate Program

The U.S. Navy’s decision on 25 November 2025 to cancel the Constellation-class frigate program serves as a clear indicator of deep-seated structural imbalances within America’s shipbuilding ecosystem. Originally intended to correct the shortcomings of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, the Constellation initiative became encumbered by mounting technical and design complications.

What began as a plan to adopt an 85% derivative of the European FREMM frigate gradually morphed into a near-entirely new U.S. design sharing only 15% similarity with its supposed base model. This redesign triggered cost growth, increased displacement, and a three-year construction delay. Consequently, the Navy terminated the program, canceling four planned ships while retaining only two under construction—both now subject to further review that will determine their fate.

The cancellation reflects more than a technical failure; it underscores the Navy’s broader struggle to produce modern vessels suited to today’s strategic environment—marked by intensified global competition and the rise of asymmetric maritime threats.

The Growing Gap Between U.S. Ambitions and China’s Expanding Naval Power

The demise of the Constellation program coincides with the rapid expansion of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The United States now faces a strategic dilemma: its fleet modernization is advancing far more slowly than China’s, which continues to produce cruisers, destroyers, and frigates at rates that far exceed U.S. industrial output.

This widening industrial gap erodes America’s ability to maintain operational superiority in the Indo-Pacific and limits its naval reach across critical maritime corridors stretching from West Asia to the eastern Mediterranean—including the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab.

Doctrinal Shifts in U.S. Naval Planning

The new U.S. administration is attempting to reshape its naval strategy, including revising naval doctrine, designing new classes of small surface combatants, and accelerating programs for unmanned surface vessels (USVs). Yet these ambitions confront several practical challenges:

1. New designs remain immature and unproven in open-ocean environments.

2. The transition from conceptual ideas to operational capabilities is expected to take considerable time.

3. Domestic political debates are complicating decisions regarding the future large-surface combatant DDG(X), with some proposals even calling for revisiting the old concept of “battleships.”

These indicators suggest that the U.S. Navy is navigating an unstable transition period in which maintaining traditional readiness levels—especially in distant theaters—has become increasingly difficult.

Implications for the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab

The Red Sea has emerged as a vivid stage illustrating the limitations of America’s modern naval capabilities. Operational experiences in both the Red Sea and the Black Sea revealed weaknesses in the Constellation-class design when facing asymmetric threats. Its capacity to carry just 32 vertical launch system (VLS) cells is now viewed as insufficient for high-intensity engagements—particularly when compared with the tactical capabilities demonstrated by Yemeni forces.

This suggests that the U.S. Navy can no longer reliably impose its traditional model of maritime control in vital waterways, especially in Bab al-Mandab, where Yemeni naval forces have shown notable operational capability.

Strategic Implications for Yemen

1. Declining Effectiveness of U.S. Naval Deterrence in the Red Sea
The growing gap between American ambitions and on-the-water realities weakens Washington’s ability to manage naval power balances in Bab al-Mandab. It also limits its capacity to protect shipping linked to the Israeli entity or counter asymmetric maritime threats with adequate effectiveness.

2. Strengthening Yemen’s Position in the Naval Deterrence Equation
Recent Red Sea operations have demonstrated that Yemeni capabilities—including precision missiles, naval drones, and aerial drones—represent a significant factor in modern maritime threat environments. As long as the U.S. struggles to develop vessels capable of countering such threats, Yemen emerges as a key actor capable of shaping new deterrence dynamics in a strategically vital waterway.

3. A Shift in Regional Calculations
Although the United States is unlikely to relinquish the Red Sea to Sana’a during the Navy’s transitional phase, its diminishing ability to enforce comprehensive maritime control is evident. Washington is increasingly compensating for this shortfall by relying more heavily on Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and their aligned local factions, as well as by granting the United Kingdom an expanded—though secondary—role in Red Sea operations.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE may accelerate acquisition of advanced naval equipment and enhancements to their maritime infrastructure, while the UK focuses on training, capacity-building, and use of UAE-controlled Yemeni ports as operational footholds.

4. A Broader Strategic Maneuvering Space for Yemen
Given the United States’ limited ability to sustain dense, long-term naval deployments in the Red Sea during this transitional period, Yemen has an opportunity to strengthen its deterrence tools, redefine rules of engagement, and consolidate its position as an influential actor in securing one of the world’s most critical maritime routes.

Overall Assessment

The cancellation of the Constellation-class frigate program signals the beginning of a turbulent transitional phase for the U.S. Navy—marked by declining shipbuilding capacity, challenges adapting to asymmetric maritime threats, and China’s accelerating naval ascent. These dynamics ripple outward toward the Red Sea, where the U.S. faces pressure to maintain its influence and stem the erosion of its maritime deterrence.

For Yemen, these developments open a significant strategic window. The expanding capabilities of the Yemeni Navy have widened the gap between U.S. naval forces and the demands of the modern operational environment. The unfolding situation points toward a new era of regional and international maritime dynamics—one in which Bab al-Mandab becomes a focal point of competing naval wills and Yemen’s maritime power plays an increasingly decisive role in shaping the contours of this transformation.